Expelled Hmong Imprisoned in Laos

The Irrawaddy News
By ALEX ELLGEE

Around 50 Hmong refugees who were forcibly repatriated by Thailand to Laos on Dec. 28 have been imprisoned in Paksan jail, according to the Fact Finding Commission (FFC), an American based NGO.

It is suggested that the group may have been isolated because of their role as leaders in the camps and during the “secret war,” when the CIA hired the Hmong as foot soldiers to prevent the spread of communism during the Vietnam War.

Above Ph: Whilst in Thailand detention in May 2009

Hmong refugees sit inside a Thai police truck during an operation
to deport thousands of ethnic Hmong asylum-seekers
to Laos in December. (Photo: Reuters)

Using a secret network of undercover researchers called “blackbirds,” the FFC were able to get confirmation on Tuesday morning about the group’s imprisonment.

“We received confirmation from our contact that around 50 leaders have been imprisoned,” said Bhou Than of the FFC.

“We are very concerned about what is happening to them and expect that more will face similar detention in the coming months.”

Speaking to The Irrawaddy on Thursday, Amnesty International confirmed that one group has been separated from other returnees and expressed concern about their treatment by the Laos government.

“We are aware that some of the leaders have been separated from the group, taken out of Vientiane and remain unaccounted for,” said Benjamin Zawacki, a Bangkok-based researcher for Amnesty.

“Our primary concern for them is torture, which we know is often employed in Laos’ prisons and could be used as a punitive measure for them bringing shame to Laos or for information gathering.”

He went on to add that Thailand has not only broken refugee law by expelling the Hmong but has also gone against the UN treaty against torture, which Thailand has signed and ratified.

“Under that treaty they are obliged not to send anyone back to a country where they are at risk of torture,” he said.

In an opinion piece published in the Bangkok Post on Jan. 13, the US Ambassador to Thailand, Eric John, said the Thai authorities said they had conducted their own screening process and 800 of the Hmong refugees were identified as having protection concerns and “should not be returned involuntarily.”

However, the names of these people were never handed over to the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) or any potential resettlement country, John said, and “the lack of transparency during the repatriation process made it impossible to determine if the return was voluntary.

“The US was disappointed at the Thai decision to deport 4,689 Laotian Hmong asylum seekers back to Laos on Dec. 28, 2009, despite clear indications that some in the group required protection,” John said.

One thousand of the refugees are reported to have been allowed to return to their villages and stay with their relatives. However, the remaining returnees are thought to be held in “camps” around Laos, according to eyewitnesses.

According to an undercover FFC researcher who recently made a clandestine trip to one of the camps in Phak Beuk, three thousand are being held there in terrible conditions.

“Our researcher went to the camp yesterday and told me that the people are only receiving small amounts of rice,” Bhou Than told The Irrawaddy.

“They aren’t being given any medicine, no clothes, no shelter, no doctors and he told us that 500 are sick with malaria...they are just living on the ground and being controlled by Lao soldiers with AK47s—we are very concerned by this news.”

According to a report in the Sydney Morning Herald on Jan. 12, reporters approached a camp at Paksan on the Mekong River, where “hundreds of Hmong hilltribes people stood barefoot in the dirt behind three metres of razor wire as loudspeakers ordered them to move away from the gate.”

“Blue tarpaulins blocked much of the view of the camp, but the tops of scores of tents could be seen in close rows. No grass or paved areas could be seen, and there appeared to be no permanent buildings,” the Herald said, adding that the reporters were escorted from the camp and told not to return.

Despite the information leaking out of Laos, the communist regime continues to claim that the refugees are being treated well. When the Lao Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Phongsavath Boupha met with ambassadors from the European Union, US and Australia on January 15, he told them the government had provided them with food, clothing and medicines.

“The government's long-term plan was to build a house for each family and allocate land for farming activities,” Phongsavath said, according to the Vientiane Times, a government mouthpiece.

Although the UNHCR continues to be denied access to the returnees, three US congressmen including Rep. Anh “Joseph” Cao of New Orleans visited Pha Lak, a separate camp south of Paksan and reported that the Hmong were being treated well.

Human rights groups have blasted their remarks, however, as being insensitive to the returnees and claimed their trip was staged by the Laos government.

“Their visit was nothing close to human rights monitoring,” said Joe Davy, a Hmong advocate in Chicago, who spoke to The Irrawaddy by phone.

“The Laos government told the refugees what to say before they arrived. There’s no way they would speak out and criticize the government for their living conditions. They’ve already seen how powerless the US is to help them so why would they speak out now and risk their lives?”

Responding on Thursday to the criticisms, which she described as unfounded and unfair, Cao spokeswoman Princella Smith said: “Accusations that Congressman Cao is insensitive to the needs of refugees or is somehow insensitive to victims of government abuse and persecution are not only wrong but absurd.”

Although most refugees came from Huay Nam Khao camp, one group of major concern for the UNHCR consists of 158 returnees (including 87 children) who, until they were sent back, were being held at an immigration detention center in Nong Khai on the border with Laos.

US Ambassador John said the refugees, who were detained for more than three years in the center, had been screened by the UNHCR prior to their detention and determined to have refugee status and were recognized as “Persons of Concern.”

The US was financing the care of the refugees while they were in detention in Thailand, John said, and the US and other countries were prepared to consider appropriate cases for resettlement in third countries.

"All the refugees we interviewed in Nong Khai told us on Dec. 28 that the did not wish to return to Laos, clearly indicating the return was involuntary,” John said.


Burma Newscasts - Expelled Hmong Imprisoned in Laos - January 22, 2010
http://www.irrawaddy.org/highlight.php?art_id=17641

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Rights group concerned over Thai policy on refugees, migrants

By Usa Pichai

Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – Deteriorating human rights records is in evidence in Thailand given the country’s policy on migrant workers and refugees, the Human Rights Watch said in its World Report 2010.

The HRW released a 612-page report on Wednesday, the organization's 20th annual review of human rights practices around the globe. It evaluated the situation in Thailand, and said that the government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva had largely failed to fulfill its pledges to make human rights a priority.

Brad Adams, Asia Director of Human Rights Watch said while Prime Minister Abhisit sometimes said the right things about human rights in 2009, his actions didn't match his words. "The government continually undermined respect for human rights and the due process of law in Thailand."

Abhisit's government blatantly flouted Thailand's obligations under international law to protect refugees and asylum seekers, the group said.

The expression of the hostile policy towards refugees and asylum seekers, was in evidence in January 2009, when in his capacity as chairman of the National Security Council, Abhisit approved a directive authorizing the military to intercept boats carrying ethnic Rohingya from Burma and Bangladesh.

The Thai Navy subsequently intercepted several boats transporting Rohingya and towed the rickety vessels back to the ocean with inadequate supplies of food and water. While Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, the Thai government has an obligation under international law of nonrefoulement (non-return) of persons to places where their life or freedom is at risk.

"Prime Minister Abhisit did not honour his pledge to uphold human rights principles and international law in 2009," Adams said. "Getting Thailand back on track as a rights-respecting nation in 2010 is crucial both for the country and the region."

The Thai government gave the green signal to the army to deport more than 4,600 Lao Hmong refugees and asylum seekers on December 28, despite international concerns including that of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN Secretary-General.

HRW also noted the failure to act against official abuses by the police. Despite the government's strong opposition to the violent approach to drug eradication by the exiled former Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, it remained unwilling to bring to justice officials allegedly responsible for more than 2,500 unresolved extrajudicial killings and serious abuses committed during Thaksin's 2003 "war on drugs" and the ongoing drug suppression operations by the police.

“At the local level, the government continued to ignore systemic police violence and extortion targeting the over two million migrant workers from Burma, Cambodia, and Laos,” HRW noted.

In addition, the other human rights backslide in Thailand are the growing crackdowns on protesters and other political critics, including intensive surveillance of the internet and a failure to curb abuses by security forces in response to the longtime insurgency in the south.

Burma Newscasts - Rights group concerned over Thai policy on refugees, migrants
Friday, 22 January 2010 15:31
http://www.mizzima.com/news/regional/3418-rights-group-concerned-over-thai-policy-on-refugees-migrants-.html

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USDA woos Muslims in Kachin state ahead of elections

By Phanida

Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – The Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) is out to woo the Muslim community living in Myitkyina since early this month for the forthcoming 2010 general elections.

Though the 2010 Electoral Law is yet to be enacted and promulgated by the junta, some political parties and organizations including USDA have been allowed to start campaign.

A delegation led by Khin Maung Latt, elder brother of Burma’s Postal and Telecommunication Minister Brig. Gen. Thein Zaw, who is a candidate in the elections in Kahcin State, where a majority are Christians, is organizing Muslims at mosques in Myitkyina.

“He told the Muslim community that peace and religious equality has been achieved during military rule so they should vote for Brig. Gen. Thein Zaw representing the USDA and nominated by the junta,” an attendee at one of the mosques told Mizzima.
(JEG's: Is it because of peace and religious equality under the junta that the Rohingya are stateless?)

The campaign team comprised Myitkyina native Khin Maung Latt, BSPP party member and former Township (administrative) Council Secretary, Kachin State USDA Executive Committee member Dr. Khin Maung Tun, retired Maj. Myint Swe, and retired Lt. Col. Myo Swe, who is mobilizing minority Muslims in Myitkyina.

They concluded the poll campaign in three mosques of the officially permitted seven in seven Wards of Myitkyina. There are over 700 Muslim devotees at these mosques, it is learnt.

The team rounded off their election campaign in Aung Nan Ward on January 1, in Kyun Pin Thar Ward on January 8, in Khay Mar Thiri on January 15 respectively. A Muslim community member from Min Yat Ward said that campaign in this ward today had to be cancelled.

Brig. Gen. Thein Zaw is running the ‘Setana Pyee Phyo’ and ‘Parami’ free clinics for people in 18 wards and villages in Myitkyina including Sitapu, Dukathaung, Naung Nan, Shwe Set, Sha Daung, a local resident said. (JEG's: will the clinics run free after elections???)

The Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP) is also planning to contest the elections. They have already conducted election campaign in 18 townships in Kachin State.

According to government statistics, there are 46 million Buddhists, three million Christians, two million Muslims and three million Hindus in Burma.


Burma Newscasts - USDA woos Muslims in Kachin state ahead of elections -
Friday, 22 January 2010 21:36
http://www.mizzima.com/news/inside-burma/3422-usda-woos-muslims-in-kachin-state-ahead-of-elections.html

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Final arguments heard in Burmese-American’s trial

By Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) – The final arguments by all lawyers in the trial against Burmese-born American citizen, Kyaw Zaw Lwin (aka) Nyi Nyi Aung was heard by a special court in Rangoon’s notorious Insein prison on Friday.

Nyan Win, one of the defence lawyers of the American citizen said “Today we submitted our final arguments. The verdict will be given on January 27.”

Arrested on September 3, 2009, Nyi Nyi Aung is facing trial on charges of fraud, forgery, illegal possession of foreign currency and charges under the Immigration Act.

However, his international counsel in New York, Beth Schwanke earlier told Mizzima that the charges were baseless and were cooked up to arrest and sentence her client as he is a well known pro-democracy activist, advocating democracy and human rights in Burma.

The Burmese-American was a student activist, involved in the nation-wide pro-democracy uprising in 1988. He was forced to flee to neighbouring Thailand in the wake of the military’s brutal crackdown on protesters.

Later, he migrated to Maryland in United States, where he was naturalized as a citizen.

Burma’s state-run media, the New Light of Myanmar, however, accused him of having entered the country secretly in disguise eight times. He was also accused of having maintained contacts with underground activists, planning to instigate public unrest.

However, the charge-sheet against him in court does not include any of the newspaper’s accusations but merely accuses Nyi Nyi Aung of using a fake Burmese national identity card, lying to the immigration, and possessing foreign currency.

Schwanke denied the first two charges and said Nyi Nyi Aung was arrested as he stepped out of the Bangkok-Rangoon Thai Airways International (TG) flight, even before he could approach the custom’s desk to declare his foreign currency. (JEG's: he is a foreigner on a visiting trip he is to carry foreign currency on him...)

“We don’t know what will be the outcome of the trial. We will have to wait and see on January 27. The court will decide what we will be doing next,” Nyan Win said.

Supreme Court advocates, Nyan Win and Kyi Win, who jointly defended detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi last year, teamed-up to defend the Burmese-American at the Southern District Court.

Burma Newscasts - Final arguments heard in Burmese-American’s trial - 22 January 2010
http://www.mizzima.com/news/inside-burma/3423-final-arguments-heard-in-burmese-americans-trial-.html

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Burma constitution ‘provides impunity’ for abuses

Oct 9, 2009 (DVB)–Burma’s redrafted 2008 constitution provides impunity for human rights abuses and should not be the bedrock for elections next year, a damning report has claimed.

Many of the provisions of the constitution suggest that “instead of being a true catalyst for lasting change, it further entrenches the military within the government and the associated culture of impunity,” the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) said.

Its report, Impunity Prolonged: Burma and its Constitution, says that within the constitution, the regime has granted itself impunity for sexual violence, forced labor and the recruitment of child soldiers.

Burma, it says, is “one of the most difficult challenges in the world in relation to making progress toward combating impunity.”

Khin Omar, coordinator of the Thailand-based Burma Partnership, said the constitution will “force military rule on Burma forever”.

“[It is] the most problematic element as to whether we move further toward being a failed state or whether we move towards national reconciliation,” she said.

The report says that “officers and troops systematically use rape and other forms of sexual abuse as a strategy of war.”

It then cites a clause within the constitution stating that: “No proceeding shall be instituted against the said Councils (the military) or any member thereof or any member of the Government, in respect to any act done in the execution of their respective duties.”

Burma expert Robert H Taylor told DVB however that “No one has proven that [rape] is public policy,” adding that “we don’t know how the military deals with instances of rape”.

He cited anonymous sources that claim the government has action against people accused of assault and rape, but added that the constitution “has its problems, but which doesn’t?”

In a sign that the regime responds to international pressure, the report cited an agreement between the junta and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to address forced labour and child soldiers.

The 2008 constitution was ratified in the weeks following cyclone Nargis last May, in which 140,000 people were killed and millions of acres of land destroyed. Despite the cyclone, the government claimed a 99 percent turnout, with 92.4 percent voting in favour.

A report released last year by Hong Kong-based constitutional expert, Professor Yash Ghai, said that “the cynicism with which the regime held the referendum and manipulated the results was on a par with the cynicism and coercion by which the draft was prepared”.

The ICTJ have called on the international community to withhold support for elections in Burma next year. Khin Omar echoed the calls, and said that a constitutional review must take place before the elections do.

Reporting by Joseph Allchin
Burma Newscasts - Burma constitution ‘provides impunity’ for abuses

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Thaw in US-Burma ties

By Chua Chin Hon
The Straits Times

The unexpected thaw in US-Burma ties in recent months has raised a host of intriguing questions.

The most obvious are perhaps the trickiest: Why do Burma's military rulers want to engage the Obama administration in dialogue, and why now? What do they hope to gain?

Diplomats familiar with the issue say it is futile to try to second-guess the thinking of the secretive military junta. Yet, the answers to these questions will shape the negotiation strategies of the United States.

At first sight, there does not seem to be any urgent or compelling reason for Burma's generals to engage their biggest critic, Washington. After all, they have successfully weathered all the criticisms and economic sanctions that the US and other Western countries have imposed since the 1990s.

And Burma's growing importance in providing resources and energy for regional powers like China and India will ensure that foreign investments continue to roll in. So why bother?

Experts who track Burma, however, say that it is wrong to assume that the junta is satisfied, or completely assured, by the status quo. They add that a combination of domestic and external factors probably prompted the generals to seek talks with Washington.

For starters, next year, Burma will hold its first election in two decades, a move widely seen as an attempt by the military to legitimise its rule. Much remains unclear about the participation of the opposition in the elections, and whether international election monitors would be admitted.

Even the date for the election has not been officially announced. But what would be abundantly clear to the junta is that any attempt to garner international recognition would be futile without some level of acceptance from the US, experts say.

"I do think that the (Burmese government) is very anxious to have international recognition and some sort of legitimacy," says Dr Bridget Welsh, a Southeast Asia scholar with the Singapore Management University (SMU).

"And when people talk about the issue of acceptance, they are really referring to this recognition from the US."

The question of whether bilateral talks - and election assistance should Burma request it - could lend legitimacy to the junta-run elections could become a political hot potato for the Obama administration, given the nature of US politics. Hence, US diplomats have hedged their recent contacts with Burmese officials with numerous caveats.

"We will continue to stress to the (Burmese) authorities the baseline conditions that we consider necessary for any credible electoral process," US Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell told a Senate hearing last Wednesday.

"They include the
release of political prisoners,
the ability of all stakeholders to stand for election,
eliminating restrictions on media, and
ensuring a free and open campaign."

Campbell met U Thaung, Burma's minister of science, technology and labour, in New York last week in what was termed the highest level contact between the two sides in nine years. The negotiators did not set a date for a second set of talks, but Campbell said he sensed from the Burmese officials "a very clear determination that dialogue was possible".

Beyond the search for international acceptance, experts say Burma's willingness to engage the US could also be prompted by the rapidly changing international environment, particularly since President Barack Obama came into office.

Obama's approach to foreign policy has been markedly different from that of his predecessor, George W. Bush, who refused direct contact with countries deemed to be rogue regimes.

It would not have escaped the attention of Burma's military rulers that other countries on Washington's blacklist - Iran and North Korea - have all had increased contact with the new US administration lately. There is little strategic value in being the odd man out in what is already the small and unpopular club of rogue nations.

But the bigger strategic issue on Burma's radar is likely to be the growing ties between the US and China, experts say. Whereas it could play one against the other before, that is no longer a given, as the two global powers see a growing convergence in their interests.

And despite Burma's close economic ties with China, the relationship is not necessarily problem-free.

"On China, we have to remember that the present army leadership grew up fighting the Communist Party of Burma, a well-armed Chinese-supported insurgent force that once threatened huge parts of the eastern uplands," historian Thant Myint-U told Wednesday's Senate hearing.

"Many see their present dependence on China as an anomaly, a tactical move that needs correction."

With all these shifting plates in motion, Burma likely has to recalibrate its position.

Said Dr Welsh of SMU: "They have to find a new configuration...and dialogue is the first step in that process."

For the US, the impetus for the talks goes beyond its traditional concerns about human rights, civil society and the imprisonment of democracy-icon Aung San Suu Kyi.

Burma's growing ties with North Korea and the uranium deposits in the central and northern parts of the country have raised fears that the junta will try to play a similar game of nuclear brinkmanship as Pyongyang has done since 2003.

So far, there has been no smoking gun evidence of Burma contemplating such a move. But that is not likely to assure Washington, which already has its hands full dealing with Iran and North Korea's nuclear ambitions.

Said Campbell: "Let me be clear: we have decided to engage with (Burma) because we believe it is in our interest to do so."

Burma Newscasts - Thaw in US-Burma ties
5 October 2009

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Peace in Name only

By DAVID SCOTT MATHIESON
The Irrawaddy News
OCTOBER, 2009 - VOLUME 17 NO.7

War and refugees will remain a fact of life in Burma as long as the root causes of conflict in the country’s borderlands remain unaddressed.

The rout of the ethnic Kokang militia, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, in northern Burma in late August has brought into stark relief what millions of people live with in Burma every day: conflict between the central state and non-state armed militias. For decades, clashes between the Burmese regime’s army and its myriad enemies have been forcing people into hiding or across borders. What is different about the recent fighting is that it involved China—not usually a country that tolerates refugees from Burma or instability along its borders.
Enlarge Image

The cause of the latest outbreak of hostilities is the decision of Burma’s ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) to pressure cease-fire groups to transform their armies into border security guard forces before next year’s election. Under the SPDC plan, which was first proposed in April, the militias would be split up into battalions consisting of 326 soldiers, mostly from ethnic militias, but with a number of Burmese government army troops and officers. The deadline for a response to the plan was June, with training to begin in October.

Many groups have refused, and with good grounds. How could an armed group such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA), with an estimated 20,000 soldiers, practically accept such a demand under such a tight timeframe? The Kachin Independence Organization seems to have diplomatically rejected the junta’s demand by conditionally agreeing to it, but other groups have declined outright, leading to fears of a resumption of armed conflict.

Yet as negative as the potential consequences of the SPDC’s demands are, the status quo is equally bad, not just for national political reforms, but also for civilian protection. Burma’s hinterlands have for most of the past 20 years been ordered into a network of semi-autonomous cease-fire zones, run by politico-military armed groups often financed by investments in the narcotics trade, illegal logging, smuggling, transport and casino capitalism. From Mon State up the eastern borderlands and around Shan State to Kachin State, a string of “special regions” has emerged, often in an uneasy coexistence with central state forces based on verbal agreements with Burmese military leaders.

For the cease-fire groups, the dividends of this arrangement included some form of autonomy in future constitutional changes, as well as national and international development assistance. In return, they agreed to stop fighting. This pact has paid off handsomely for the leaders of the various groups, many of whom have amassed substantial fortunes. But for many of their “constituents,” the cessation of active conflict has only produced a tenuous peace.

Paradoxically, the number of armed groups in Burma has actually increased since the cease-fires, because of factionalism and local security requirements.

Burma has been through all of this before. In the 1960s, the Tatmadaw created Ka Kwe Ye (Home Guard) units, sometimes called “anti-insurgency forces,” from the private armies of local warlords. Pyithu Sit (People’s Militias) have also increased, especially in Shan State, where, as local motley bands of militia under the direction of Tatmadaw battalions, they often exist as the bottom feeders of the Burmese drug trade, acting little better than modern dacoits.

The Kokang showdown was preceded in a more peaceful, if not more productive, format, in early 2005, when the SPDC forced the surrender of the Palaung State Liberation Party. According to the Palaung Women’s Organization, the surrender dramatically increased suffering among the civilian population.

Two years later, in 2007, the small Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization split into three factions as a result of intensified pressure from the SPDC to surrender their weapons. One of their military leaders who broke the cease-fire and returned to active hostilities, Col Hkun Thu Rein, said, “We got nothing from the cease-fire. Even when international development agencies came to our area, the SPDC warned us not to tell the truth.”

The one seemingly avid convert to the border guard scheme, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), was not surprising, marking the group’s gradual transformation from a splinter faction of the Karen National Union with some genuine political and social grievances to a snarling criminal gang with somewhat unconvincing appeals to nationalism. The DKBA’s growing business empire along the Thai-Burmese border shows the economic returns of cooperation: agro-business, people smuggling, illegal car importation, cattle smuggling, mining, transportation concessions, and local methamphetamine production and trafficking. In return, the DKBA has continued to attack Karen communities inside Burma, and now acts as little more than a willing auxiliary of the SPDC.

Non-state armed groups such as the DKBA are being primed by the SPDC to act as border militias under a future civilian government, and if recent fighting is any indication, many groups could act with the same ferocity and disregard for civilian protection as the Burmese army.
Weapons seized from Kokang rebels are displayed by the Burmese police in laogai on Sept. 8.

War has displaced millions of civilians in Burma. Currently there are nearly half a million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in eastern Burma alone. Around 150,000 refugees live in nine camps along the Thai-Burmese border, even though more than 46,000 have been resettled to third countries since 2005. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Shan struggle for survival in northern Thailand, unregistered and unrecognized as anything more than migrant workers. India has more than 50,000 ethnic Chin refugees and thousands more Burmese refugees in Mizoram and New Delhi. Some 28,000 Rohingya Muslims from Arakan State live in dire conditions in camps in Bangladesh, with about 200,000 more living in surrounding areas. Burmese refugees also live either as migrant workers or UN-recognized asylum seekers in Malaysia, Singapore and scores of other countries around the world.

The fate of the displaced varies vastly, depending on a host of factors. Sometimes even groups that are located in close proximity to each other can be worlds apart in terms of their access to assistance.

Take, for example, the camp for Shan IDPs across from Mae Fah Luang in Thailand. Home to nearly 3,000 civilians, the village of Wan Loi Saw Nien is made up of assorted Shan, Lahu, Akha, Palaung and Chinese from throughout eastern Shan State who were displaced by more than 10 years of fighting between the Shan State Army-South and the UWSA and Tatmadaw. Much of the fighting started because the UWSA forced some 100,000 civilians from its northern area to resettle along the Thai border to create a new enclave called Mong Yawn, basically to provide a civilian cover for intensified methamphetamine production.

This disastrous experiment in mini-state creation also produced the UWSA-controlled town of Yawngkha, just 9 km from Wan Loi Saw Nien. However, the experiences of the two towns couldn’t be more different. Yawngkha receives UN assistance, funding from Thailand’s Mae Fah Luang Foundation, and visits from Western academics in Tatmadaw helicopters. Wan Loi Saw Nien, on the other hand, is shunned by UN and international relief agencies because the UN doesn’t “do” borders. This could, however, change if the SSA signs a cease-fire agreement with the regime.

Abuses against civilians in conflict areas and around cease-fire zones have been exhaustively documented in the annual internal displacement surveys of the Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), as well as by several grassroots documentation organizations, such as the Karen Human Rights Group and the Human Rights Foundation of Monland, among others.

Although there is some truth to the argument that there are fewer human rights violations in ethnic areas as a result of decreased hostilities, it is more accurate to say that the patterns of human rights violations have changed.

While horrific numbers of abuses were perpetrated by all sides in the conflict during active hostilities, many civilians living in or near cease-fire zones must now bear the burden of heavier militarization, with the attendant demands for forced labor, food and anything else that Burmese government forces “living off the land” require. Meanwhile, other abuses normally associated with open conflict, such as rape and summary executions of civilians, continue, as evidenced by the recent attacks in the Kokang region and central Shan and Karen states.

Under the Second Additional Protocol of the Geneva Convention, attacks against civilians, the destruction of things indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as food, crops and water supply, and the forced removal of civilians unless it is for their own safety or for imperative military reasons, are prohibited. Furthermore, parties to the conflict must facilitate immediate and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance.

The Tatmadaw and its proxy forces have blatantly violated these principles of customary international humanitarian law for years. In a remarkable and rare public denunciation in June 2007, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) cited what it called “major and repeated violations of international humanitarian law” by the “Government of Myanmar” against civilians in eastern Burma between 2000 and 2005.

The only thing more remarkable than the ICRC’s highly unorthodox public statement was the apathy with which it was received by the international community. It was as if the world shrugged and thought, “Heard it all before.”

Well, in fact, the world has heard it all before, and refused to act. The recent report by the Harvard Law School Human Rights Clinic, “Crimes in Burma,” used United Nations documents to demonstrate that since 2002, crimes in conflict areas have been widespread and systematic, especially in regards to forced displacement, sexual violence, torture and murder. And yet, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon refused to discuss the matter either within the UN Security Council or during his fruitless visit to Burma in July this year. Ban did give a strong speech (at the Rangoon Drug Eradication Museum, of all places) on Burma’s deplorable human rights record, but the UN has done precious little to address it.

The willful refusal to acknowledge the scale of human rights violations in Burma’s conflict zones is absolutely inexcusable. And yet, a muttering cabal of academics, international relief workers and erstwhile Western investors is seeking to roll back years of documentation proving the extent of the suffering in IDP and refugee zones. Some even preface these exhaustively documented human rights violations with the word “alleged,” as if there were any doubt about the atrocities being committed in the name of Burma’s “national reconsolidation.”

Much of the new wave of denial is linked to an endorsement of next year’s planned elections, which some see as an opportunity to create a small opening for change inside Burma. Yet one layer of these reforms—the long postponed incorporation of ethnic armed groups—suddenly looks to be in jeopardy after two decades of relative stasis.

For the international media, the recent Kokang fighting has evoked comparisons to Darfur, the Congo, Sri Lanka and other countries that have disintegrated into war zones of disorder. But the best guide to Burma’s future is its own past: if the cease-fire areas descend into conflict again, they will resemble the situation before the cease-fires of 1989. That was a period of intense warfare on several fronts throughout the country, with dozens of armed groups of varying legitimacy. At the time, human rights documentation was rudimentary and refugees spilled across borders unheeded, or were pushed back mercilessly.

Should war resume in parts of Burma’s borderlands, the country will simply return to its pre-1989 situation, and the challenges of national reconciliation and local sustainable development will begin again.

David Scott Mathieson is the Burma Researcher for Human Rights Watch.

Burma Newscasts - Peace in Name only
OCTOBER, 2009 - VOLUME 17 NO.7

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US embassy to put up lawyers for detained citizen

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) – The US embassy in Rangoon has got in touch with lawyers to defend its detained citizen, Aung Kyaw Zaw, arrested on arrival in the former Burmese capital’s international airport on September 3.

Kyi Win, a high court advocate, on Friday told Mizzima that he was contacted by the US embassy to defend Aung Kyaw Zaw (alias) Nyi Nyi Aung, currently detained in Rangoon’s notorious Insein prison.

“The embassy contacted us to defend him and offered us a fee equivalent to the amount paid to the lawyer they had hired for John William Yettaw. But we said we are willing to provide ‘Pro Bono’ [free of charge] service,” Kyi Win said.

Kyi Win said the embassy had contacted him and his colleague Nyan Win, with whom he teamed up to defend detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, to take up Nyi Nyi Aung’s case.

Both Kyi Win and Nyan Win are advocates practicing in the high court.

“I don’t know if Nyi Nyi Aung has been charged yet. I am yet to receive a reply from the embassy,” Kyi Win said.

While it is still not clear whether he has been charged and on what grounds, a report in the state-run media the New Light of Myanmar newspaper last week accused Nyi Nyi Aung of trying to instigate civil unrest in cahoots with underground activists inside Burma.

The report also accused Nyi Nyi Aung of working together with several Burmese organizations in exile including the Forum for Democracy in Burma (FDB), the Student and Youth Congress of Burma (SYCB) and alleged that he had provided financial assistance to activists inside the country.

Nyi Nyi Aung was a student activist and was involved in the 1988 student-led uprising. He along with several other students fled to Thailand in the wake of the military crackdown on protesters. Later he was resettled in United States from Thailand and was naturalized as a US citizen.

Nyi Nyi Aung holds a valid US passport and had a legal social visit Visa to Burma. He flew from Bangkok to Rangoon on September 3 on a TG flight.

Since his arrest, Nyi Nyi Aung was taken to several interrogation centres, where he allegedly endured torture. He was finally taken to the Insein prison. The US embassy spokesman said, Nyi Nyi Aung had complained of ill-treatment during their meeting.

Burma Newscasts - US embassy to put up lawyers for detained citizen
Friday, 02 October 2009 21:28

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Crackdown on Burmese Dissidents in Chiang Mai

By THE IRRAWADDY

Thai police officers on Sunday raided the offices of several exiled Burmese opposition groups including the Human Rights Education Institute of Burma, the Burmese Women’s Union and the National Health and Education Committee.

A Burmese source confirmed that 10 Burmese women from the Burmese Women’s Union who were attending a capacity-building workshop in Chiang Mai were apprehended and are now in custody.

The police came with information and photos of the locations of Burmese offices. The arrests took place on Sunday when many offices were closed for the weekend.

The offices of several Chiang Mai-based Burmese opposition groups and media organizations have remained temporarily closed on Monday. The motive for the arrests and the reason why Burmese human rights workers and dissidents have been targeted is not yet known.

Several exiled Burmese and foreign groups have opened NGOs and advocacy offices in Chiang Mai in recent years.

Burmese groups faced the most repressive times under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s administration in the early 2000s. Many offices were shut down for several weeks due to fears of intimidation and crackdowns.

International human rights groups and Western governments expressed concern for the safety of exiled Burmese dissidents living in Thailand at the time.

Under the current Thai government, Burmese groups in Thailand have enjoyed relative freedom without any major harassment.

According to diplomatic sources, Western embassies in Bangkok are closely watching the situation.

Burma Newscasts - Crackdown on Burmese Dissidents in Chiang Mai
Monday, September 14, 2009

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Offices of Burmese groups in Thailand raided

by Mungpi

New Delhi (Mizzima) - Unprecedented security checks has led to Thailand’s police raiding the offices of some Burmese opposition groups based in northern Thailand’s Chiang Mai city on Sunday, opposition members said.

The police, according to Burmese opposition members, came with a list of addresses of Burmese offices and took photographs.

“Since there was only our office worker in our office, we did not have any problem, but the police took photographs of the office,” a Burmese activist, whose office was also among those visited by the police, told Mizzima.

While Thailand’s Royal Police could not be reached on Monday for comment, a Burmese activist said, “This is the first time in many years that this kind of widespread search and interrogation has been made. I believe there is something behind this. “It is a targeted search, because it has been carried out only on Burmese organizations. It could be politically connected,” he further speculated.

The Thai police have often raided the offices of Burmese organizations in the past. But the source said it was never conducted in such a widespread manner.

“They have the list of most of the Burmese groups including some of the media offices in exile,” said a Burmese activist, who requested not to be named for security reasons.

Aung Myo Myint, Director of the Human Rights Education Institute of Burma (HREIB), whose office was also among those searched, said interrogating a human rights office is in violation of the basic rights of the people and condemned the action of the police.

“We are working to promote human rights and coming to our office and interrogating us is violating our basic rights,” he said.

According to the Migrant Assistant Program (MAP) and other NGOs, currently Thailand hosts about two million Burmese migrant workers and about 140,000 refugees in nine camps along the Thai-Burma border.

Burma Newscasts - Offices of Burmese groups in Thailand raided
Monday, 14 September 2009 16:46

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Burma’s New Constitution Privileges Soldiers above Civilians

By HTET AUNG
The Irrawaddy News

For decades, politics in Burma has been in crisis and the eventual outcome is often violence and oppression. Subjected to extreme poverty, armed conflicts and natural disaster, the people, like it or not, approved a new constitution in 2008.

The average Burmese citizen probably expects life to be less oppressive under a new civilian government. However, there is no escaping the fact that Burma’s third constitution was designed by the junta to institutionalize its role in politics.

Born with the nation’s independence struggle and believing its role is to safeguard the country from disintegration—a conventional excuse by military leaders to claim legitimacy—the Burmese military has constructed a legal fortress in the new constitution, which it calls its “national political leadership role of the State.”

This is the heart of the military-designed constitution and exemplifies its distrust of civilian politicians, and the role of the public in forming a consensus in society.

In democratic theory, if a single party wins a majority of seats in parliament, a country can enjoy stability and development with the support of the majority of the population. It can also avoid a coalition form of government that can often create instability in politics.

But Burma’s constitution is different, and it is constructed to avoid the dominance of a single civilian party, which could provide a viable opposition to the military rulers.


Soldiers and the Making of Laws

Therefore, the constitution was built around a theory of “disciplined democracy” with 25 percent of the bicameral parliament comprised of military representatives—a maneuver that is intended to avoid another 1990-style election in which the opposition party won a landslide victory.

The military is guarantied 110 out of 440 seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw (People’s Parliament) and 56 out of 224 seats in the Amyotha Hluttaw (Nationalities Parliament). Also, military officials will hold the same share in state and region Hluttaws as well as the leading bodies of self-administrative areas. Section 121/j bans all civil service personnel from contesting in the Hluttaw elections.

Even though it has only 25 percent representation in parliament, the military becomes the dominate block in the legislative process, because to approve or reject a constitutional amendment or legislative bill requires the approval of more than 75 percent of parliament.

In this scenario, there a single political party, even if it had 100 percent unanimity, can not pass its proposed legislation without the approval of the military representatives in parliament. Thus, political parties are forced to seek a coalition or compromise with the military.

However, the constitution stipulates that the military doesn’t need the approval of parliament for legislation related specifically to defense and security affairs. Section 20/b stipulates that “the Defense Services has the right to independently administer and adjudicate all affairs of the armed forces.”

Moreover, Hluttaw committees, commissions and bodies for defense and security affairs must be comprised of a majority of military-appointed representatives, according to Section 115 and 147.

Soldiers and Ruling a Nation

The 2008 constitution stipulates that the president is elected by a Presidential Electoral College, as stated in Clause 60.

The Electoral College is formed into three groups—one each from the Pyithu and Amyotha Hluttaw, and a third entity of appointed representatives of the military drawn from both Hluttaws. The groups will elect three presidential candidates and the military will nominate one candidate.

Like the NLD’s landslide victory in the 1990 election, a political party could win the majority of 330 seats in Pyithu Hluttaw. But it can’t expect their candidate to be elected president and form a government because one of the criteria for the president, as stated in Clause 59/d, is that the president has to be “well acquainted” with military affairs, which limits the chances of a non-military approved candidate being elected but does not make it impossible.

Therefore, the president’s power has been limited in the affairs of defense and security. Without seeking the consent of the president, the commander-in-chief of the military can independently appoint and operate three ministries: Defense, Home Affairs and Border Affairs.

Some constitutional observers may argue that this is a fair sharing of power between the military and a civilian government. But the constitution also offers absolute powers to the military that go against any normal democratic-based constitution.


National Defense and Security Council: A Supreme Power

The most powerful body created by the constitution is the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC). The body is composed of 11 members with the military granted six positions, ensuring that all the important affairs of state brought to the NDSC will be under the effective control of the military.

The NDSC’s four major tasks are: first, the president has to “appoint the commander-in-chief of Defense Services with the [NDSC’s] proposal and approval” as stated in Section 342;

Second, if declaring a state of emergency nationwide, the president must transfer “legislative, executive and judiciary powers to the commander-in-chief,” as stated in Section 417 and 418; third, the commander-in-chief can rule the country a maximum of two years under the state of emergency, and after the period, the NDSC will exercise the three powers under the name of the president, as stated in Section 421, 427 and 431; fourth, Section 429 stipulates that the NDSC will hold the general election in accord with the provisions of the constitution within six months from the day of withdrawing the state of emergency.

In spite of the above-mentioned constitutional rights, the military generals further cemented their power with one more important clause in Section 20/f: “The Defense Services is mainly responsible for safeguarding the Constitution.”

Translation: at any time, Burma can return to total military rule if the generals believe there is a threat to the constitution.

Htet Aung can be reached at htetaung69(@)gmail.com

Burma Newscasts - Burma’s New Constitution Privileges Soldiers above Civilians
7 September 2009

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A Roof Over Their Heads

By SOE LWIN
The Irrawaddy News

DEDAYE, Irrawaddy Delta—Forty-two-year-old Khin Htay was promised a house within two or three months. Six months later, she has not heard anything more about it, far less receiving any building materials.

“We don’t feel safe whenever a strong wind blow through this makeshift house,” said Khin Htay, a mother of five from Dedaye Township in the Irrawaddy delta.

Young boys collect water from a fresh-water pond near Laputta Township in Irrawaddy delta. (Photo: Reuters)

Adding to her fears is the memory of losing her husband and seven-month-old daughter when Cyclone Nargis wreaked havoc on her village in May 2008.

“Where shall we all stay if another cyclone destroys our home?” she asked despairingly.

Khin Htay and her young family are just a few of the hundreds of thousands of cyclone survivors who are still living in inadequate shelters some 16 months after the disaster.
The worst natural disaster in the country’s modern history killed close to 140,000 people and severely affected over two million.

About 360,000 homes were destroyed outright by the cyclone, according to official data.

According to UN-HABITAT, which takes a leading role in rebuilding houses for the cyclone survivors, more than 450,000 people are in still dire need of shelter aid.

In a recent statement, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Myanmar [Burma] Bishow Parajuli said, "Up to 130,000 families remain exposed and are suffering under severe weather conditions due to a lack of sustainable shelter."

However, humanitarian agencies have claimed that a shortfall of funds has hampered their efforts in rebuilding adequate shelters for the cyclone victims.

According to UN-HABITAT it has received only one-third of its requested amount of funds to rebuild adequate shelters for the displaced survivors.

UN-HABITAT said it requested some US $150 million for repairs and reconstruction under the Post Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan (PONREPP). But only about $50 million has been received.

So far, humanitarian agencies have reportedly rebuilt about 25,000 houses. For its part, the Burmese military government claims to have built more than 10,000 houses to date, a very small percentage considering the magnitude of the crisis.

According to the UN, about 209,000 families have reportedly rebuilt their own homes with their own hands over the past year.

But while some families wait for housing materials, others expect housing material and new land.

In Mhawbi Village in Pyapon Township, some families have been told they will be given housing materials, but that they have to find their own land to build on.

“We very much thank the agencies for saying they will build houses for us,” an elderly man from the village said. “But how can we afford the land to build a house on when we don’t have any money?”

Burma Newscasts - A Roof Over Their Heads
7 September 2009

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Inevitable US policy shift on Burma: why and how

by Min Zaw Oo

Mizzima News - The recent visit of US Senator Jim Webb has stirred up speculation and criticism of what the visit could mean for Washington’s Burma policy, especially from traditional supporters of the opposition movement residing in the West. A common, critical sound bite belittles Webb’s visit as a personal trip. But all detractors and critics largely ignore the fundamental facts related to the visit and the inevitability of a US policy shift on Burma.

There are three major underlying reasons encompassing the US’s new policy towards Burma.

Strategic Paradigm Shift

Under President Obama the most fundamental deviation from the Bush administration’s foreign policy is the recognition of the limit of US power in the world. The Bush administration’s neo-conservative worldview called for the use of US power to bring about freedom and democracy. In contrast, Obama and his strategic advisors acknowledge that the extension of US power has reached a critical threshold.

The US has become a declining power in the face of a rising China, Russia and India. Although the US is still the most powerful nation militarily, the US economy is largely interdependent with the Asian economy. China holds the largest percentage of US debt. The combination of Japanese and Chinese ownership of US debt has reached 45 percent of US Treasury securities.

In addition, the military gap is narrowing. A recent study conducted by the RAND Corporation, an influential US think-tank, concludes the Chinese military could defeat US forces in the Taiwan Strait if the US attempted to deter a Chinese offensive to reclaim Taiwan. Meanwhile, Russia has fielded its latest S-400 air-defense system which it claims to be superior to the US’s second-generation Patriot missile system.

During this onset of US power decline the strategic goal of the Obama administration has become the restoration of US dominance in the world. But Obama realizes that the most effective approach to this end will be the utilization of ‘soft power,’ which calls for friendliness rather than coercion.

Under a new strategic paradigm, Obama will deliberately drop democracy promotion from the US’s major foreign policy agenda. He carefully avoided the word ‘democracy’ in his inaugural speech. In contrast, he explicitly proclaimed the US will reach out to non-democracies rather than preaching to them the merits of political transformation in the interests of the US.

This new strategic perspective will shape the US’s policy shift on Burma as well.

The Role of ASEAN

Another strategy shift from the Bush administration has been the US’s perspective on ASEAN. The former administration considered it a non-priority strategic region except in the case of the War on Terror.

The Bush administration refused to ratify the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), requiring all signatories to refrain from using military force against other member states. Additionally, the issue of Burma used to be an obstacle between the US and ASEAN. The Bush administration promoted more bilateral relations with non-NATO allies such as Thailand and the Philippines, rather than multilateral cooperation with the region as a whole.

While the US kept its distance from ASEAN, China launched an efficacious charm offensive in the region. After ASEAN was hit by the financial crisis in 1997, Chinese economic assistance to countries in the region surpassed US aid, even to traditional US allies Thailand and the Philippines.

China’s ratification of the TAC pacified the fear of ASEAN countries concerning the rise of the dragon. ASEAN, as a consequence, has grown increasingly comfortable with China over the last ten years. China’s total trade with ASEAN has grown by 1,034 percent since 1995, whereas the same figure for the US stands at a mere 75 percent.

The new administration in Washington feels China’s heat in the region. Bilateral relations cannot simply preserve waning US influence in Southeast Asia, in the view of the new administration, with non-NATO allies; the US has to embrace ASEAN as a whole. As a result, Washington acceded to the TAC on July 22nd, 2009.

If the US aims to move closer to ASEAN, Burma cannot be allowed to be a stumbling block between Washington and rising Asian power blocs.

China Factor

The third reason is the strategic role of China in the region. The Burma-China relationship will enter a new chapter after China completes an oil pipeline connecting the Andaman Sea with China’s Yunnan province. The move is alarmingly strategic.

Past Chinese interest in Burma was less critical than many observers have speculated, with trade accounting for a fraction of one percent of overall Chinese exports, while China has failed to transfer any strategic weaponry to Naypyitaw.

However, the 2.9-billion dollar Chinese oil pipeline will drastically transform the role of Burma in China’s strategic calculus. China has been geographically vulnerable to a naval blockade, being confined by Japan to the east, Taiwan to the south and South Korea to the north of China – all US allies. In addition, China lacks a naval force capable of protecting its sea lines.

Chinese security analysts from the Energy Research Institute (ERI) and China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) have long been advocating the construction of overland transnational oil pipelines to China to overcome its energy insecurity in the face of a possible military confrontation with the US.

The projected oil pipeline from Burma will reinforce China’s long-term strategic energy initiative. The pipeline will be much more significant than any existing China-Burma engagements. China may even consider protecting its interest in Burma under a nuclear umbrella.

The pipeline in Burma will be a plausible reason for China to send its advanced submarines, China’s major naval assets, to the Andaman Sea to protect its strategic interest, simultaneously restricting the regional power projection of the US Navy’s 7th fleet.

Although the US is militarily capable of attacking China’s land-based pipelines and pumping stations in Burma, any military action involving a third-country in an event of direct confrontation between the US and China will be politically complicated – especially since the US’s recent accession to the TAC effectively limits Washington’s potential counter measures.

Burma used to be a moral issue for the United States. At this time, however, Washington’s renewed interest in Burma is derived from US security and national interests.

United States’ Policy Review on Burma

In recent weeks the CIA, Pentagon and Department of Energy have been ordered to intensify research on Burma with an aim of compiling a comprehensive report for policy review.

To this extent, Jim Webb is not a lone wolf. Senior senators such as John Kerry and Richard Lugar, a key figure in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, acknowledge the shortcomings of the current US policy on Burma. Lugar previously broke ranks with his Republican Party on Cuba, calling for normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

As the moral dimension of the Burma policy still looms large in Washington, advocates of new initiatives prefer behind-the-scenes approaches. Although the official position of the State Department is still intact, analysts within the policy circle are busy calculating the pros and cons of the US’s policy on Burma.

The moral dimension of the current policy is set to fade, albeit not entirely dissipated. If US national interest becomes the backbone of its new policy on Burma, Washington’s policy shift concerning Naypyitaw will be unstoppable.

How will the US engage Burma?

Regardless of policy perspectives, the US’s engagement with Burma’s military government will be quite different from the way ASEAN does business.

Democratization and human rights will still be a part of US policy goals in Burma. But the US will drop some major preconditions for engagement, such as the release of Aung Sun Suu Kyi and all political prisoners.

In the near future the two countries will likely experience quid pro quo engagement, ranging from counter-narcotics to political prisoners. Among all initiatives, however, the focus of US policy will be on the 2010 elections.

This is a major shift from the Bush administration, which adamantly demanded that transition in Burma must come through a negotiated settlement between the government and the NLD. While the US’s new policy will hail any conciliatory settlement between the opposition and the government, Washington will no longer hold its breath on a dialogue-driven transition in Burma. The US, in the wake of successful elections, will very likely embrace a military-led transition in the country if the new government manages to free Aung San Suu Kyi and remaining political prisoners after 2010.

The most crucial aspect of the US’s policy on Burma will probably be the legitimacy of the 2010 election. Washington does not want to altogether abandon its moral code, and thus will need a plausible reason to facilitate its policy shift on Burma. The legitimacy of the 2010 election will be the best ticket for the US to move closer to Burma in the near future.

The international community, including the US, has asked the Tatmadaw government to hold an inclusive election. Inclusiveness calls for the political participation of opposition parties, especially the NLD. To legitimize the election the Tatmadaw government has to allow the NLD and other opposition parties to contest. On the other hand, the NLD’s voluntary boycott, per se, will not de-legitimize the election as long as the government formally allows it to participate. Historically, opposition boycotts to elections sponsored by ruling regimes, such as in Bangladesh in 1991 and in Ethiopia in 1995, have proved fruitless.

As long as the elected representatives reflect the actual vote, the 2010 election will be internationally perceived as legitimate.

The election will strategically alter Burma’s political landscape for decades to come. Concurrently, Burma’s relationship with the US will depend on the legitimacy of the election and civilian representation in the post-2010 government reflective of electoral results. If, then, the new government is capable of addressing international concerns on human rights issues, Burma’s relationship with the West will gradually strengthen.

(Min Zaw Oo is a PhD candidate writing a dissertation on the study of 115 transitions to democracy at George Mason University. He holds a MA in security studies from Georgetown University and MS in conflict analysis and resolution from George Mason University.)

Burma Newscasts - Inevitable US policy shift on Burma: why and how
7 September 2009

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Monk accused of suicide produced in court

by Phanida

Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – Ashin Sanda Dika, who was charged with attempted suicide by setting himself on fire, was produced in court on Thursday, sources in the court and opposition said.

The monk Ashin Sanda Dika (36) was disrobed and had to face trial in court inside the Insein prison. Sub-Inspector of Police Zaw Phone Win acted as prosecutor at the Bahan Township court in the case under section 295(a) of the Penal Code (insulting religion). The monk sojourned at Laykyun Mannaing monastery, Daesun pagoda in Pegu Division.

“The four witnesses were called and three of them were examined. The prosecutor also testified,” the High Court source told Mizzima. According to another source, all the witnesses were police personnel.

Nyi Nyi Lwin-turned-Ahsin Sanda Dika defended himself.

“Restriction of movement of a monk in this place is not in accordance with the Canon Law of Buddhism. The Sayadaw (abbot) came here with permission during Buddhist lent. He did not insult the religion. He asked these questions and raised these issues in the court himself,” a person close to the accused said.

The Bahan police station personnel arrested him on August 11, after he visited places near the National League for Democracy (NLD) headquarters and the Insein prison to find about the court’s judgment on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s trial on that day.

The three men took Ashin Sanda Dika to the police station in Rangoon North District and at least two policemen beat him up with bamboo poles, the Asia Human Right Commission (AHRC) said.

According to the examination by both prosecution and defence lawyers in court, there was no material evidence such as kerosene found at the scene of the crime. And there were no independent witnesses, the AHRC said.

Meanwhile other monk-related incidents have taken place in Chauk, Yenanchaung and Pakokku townships in Magwe Division on August 27 and August 31. These places were searched and some arrests were made, the All Burma Monks Organization said.

“In fact, the SPDC (junta) is insulting the religion. Our monks are living under the order of Dhama. Arresting monks and charging them with various sections of various laws make us suffer from inferiority complex in comparison to other religions. We are losing face in the world,” U Dhama Wuntha from the monk organization said.

According to War Office sources in Naypyidaw, the junta is expecting another uprising led by monks and it has ordered tightening of security and is closely watch monasteries.

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The Coils of Custom

By AYE CHAN MYATE
The Irrawaddy News
SEPTEMBER, 2009 - VOLUME 17 NO.6

As tourism drops, many Padaung abandon the tradition of putting bronze coils on the necks of their daughters

Though likened to “human zoos” whose residents are seemingly caged like exotic birds, the Padaung tourist villages of Mae Hong Son Province used to be relatively prosperous.

U Ladu, the Padaung headman of Ban Nai Soi, said they can no longer count on tourists coming to see their “long neck” women, who are famous for the bronze coils wound around their necks, since the numbers of foreign visitors coming to the province has dropped sharply.

Padaung women are a major tourist attraction in Mae Hong Son Province in Thailand.

“The tour companies have stopped contributing to the individual monthly incomes of 1,000 to 1,500 baht (US $30-$45) received by our women,” said U Ladu. “They no longer provide food rations of beans, pulses and cans of fish.

“We’ve got enough rice for six or seven months, but we no longer get any regular income or food donations. We haven’t been provided for on a regularly basis for almost eight years. Sometimes supplies come, and sometimes they don’t. The worst is when we get sick—we can no longer afford medical care,” he said.

A sub-tribe of Burma’s Karenni people, the Padaung were among almost 200,000 refugees that left Burma for Thailand by 2005, according to estimates by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

Driven from their homes in the Demawsoe area between Loikaw and Kyaphogyi in Karenni State by economic distress and military oppression, they migrated to Thailand over a 20-year period.

The 500 Padaung who settled in Thailand came as a windfall for Thai businessmen and provincial authorities, who placed them in three fenced-off villages—Ban Nai Soi, Ban Sua Thao and Huai Pu Keng—near Mae Hong Son in northwestern Thailand. The Padaung were not given official status, but they were free to leave the villages provided they did not go too far, though in practice this was discouraged.

Foreign tourists wanting to see and photograph the Padaung women wearing their iconic bronze coils had to pay 250 baht ($7.30) to enter the villages.

During the boom years of Thailand’s tourism in the 1990s business was good. The Padaung women could earn up to 3,000 baht ($120 at that time) per month by having their photographs taken and selling handicrafts. A 2008 report in the The Irrawaddy said Ban Nai Soi, the largest Padaung village, attracted around 1,200 tourists annually.

Travel writers observed that the Padaung were better off in the tourist villages in Thailand than they would have been in Burma. The local authorities who promoted them as a tourist attraction and the tour operators were happy.

In 1998, however, a scandal broke out when a Thai businessman was charged with luring some Padaung to Thailand, promising to take them to their relations in Mae Hong Son Province, but allegedly forcing them to live as virtual prisoners in a camp in Thaton, a small tourist town in the north of Chiang Mai Province.

The scandal died down when they were sent to join their relatives in Mae Hong Son, but the taint of “human zoos” tarnished Thailand’s reputation.

In 2008, the Thai government was accused of denying exit visas to 20 Padaungs who were being offered opportunities for resettlement in Finland and New Zealand. Observers accused the Thais of keeping the Padaungs because they did not want to lose tourist business.

The Thai authorities were reluctant to give an explanation for denying the Padaungs exit permits, but according to U Lay Maung, the chairman of the Karenni Refugee Committee, the Thais are now saying the Padaung can qualify for resettlement provided they live in a UNHCR camp. A UNHCR source said that to get an exit permit the Padaung women must also remove their neck rings.

“Even though they are not providing regular food, the Thai authorities are giving them [the Padaung] a choice: they can move into the refugee camp, in which case they must hold a UNHCR refugee card, or they can get legal permits to stay in Thailand. If they stay in Thailand, the Thai authorities are saying their children will be able to enroll at the village schools,” U Lay Maung said.

With regional competition, political disturbances and the global economic crisis causing a dramatic decline in numbers of tourists entering Thailand—in the first four months of 2009 numbers fell by almost 20 percent from the same period in 2008—the Thai offer may not be enough to keep the Padaung.

“Only 20 tourists came to the village in the last 10 days,” said U Ladu, adding that these had been the busiest days all month. As he spoke, three Chinese tourists were wandering around and taking photographs. “The villagers will only get money if they can sell their handicrafts,” he said.

U Lay Maung said, “Many of the villagers have been totally without income for the whole year,” adding that they had to eke out an existence by farming small plots. When the Padaung villagers asked for food from the Karenni refugee camp, they were refused because supplies were already insufficient and there was no additional budget, he said.

The children, however, can get an education. “Many of the village children go to the school in Karenni Refugee Camp-1, which is an hour’s walk from the village,” U Lay Maung said, “and more and more Padaungs are no longer putting the coils on their daughters’ necks if they go to school.”

U Ladu’s wife, Ma Hu Htee, wears the bronze coils, but she says they are not putting them on their daughter, a 9th grade student at the school in the refugee camp.

“Originally, about 50 of us wore coils in this village,” Ma Hu Htee said, “But now only 23 still wear them. The older ones can deal with the looks when we go out, but we don’t want our children to suffer when they go to school.

“We don’t really know how we came to wear them. My parents began putting them on my neck when I was 6-years old, just as their mothers and fathers had done before,” she said.

Some think the coils made the women look more beautiful and were a display of wealth, others that the coils protected them from abduction by other tribes by making them look ugly. A tribal myth suggested that the coils protected the women from tigers, but whatever the reason for wearing them, the coils are injurious to the wearer.

As a child grows, more coils are added each year, pushing down the collarbones and squashing the vertebrae, and making the neck look longer. A full set worn by an adult may have more than 20 coils and weigh 5 kilograms.

In the three Padaung tourist villages, fewer women wear the traditional coils, according to U Lay Maung.

“In times of robust tourism, private Thai companies used to take care of [Padaung] education and provide scholarships for their children,” U Lay Maung said, adding that every tourist brochure for Mae Hong Son Province would have a picture of a Padaung woman wearing coils in it.

“But many of the younger generation want to abandon the coils to get an education,” he said, saying that some of the young girls were adept at learning languages and could make money working as tourist guides.

A few Padaung families live outside Mae Hong Son Province in at least three small tourist villages in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces. How long they will be willing to stay remains to be seen, however, especially when they hear their kin in Mae Hong Son are being resettled in third countries.

U Ladu knows what he wants for his daughter. “She could marry someone from around here in the next three or four years and be stuck here,” he said, “but I want her to resettle in a third country where she can continue her education.”

READ MORE---> The Coils of Custom...

The Grass is Greener

By SAW YAN NAING
The Irrawaddy News
SEPTEMBER, 2009 - VOLUME 17 NO.6

Despite the difficulties and challenges facing Shan migrants seeking work in Thailand, their numbers are increasing

I feel my life in Thailand is more secure than in Burma. It is easier to make a living here,” said Sam Htun, a 56-year-old Shan construction worker, who said he left Burma because of oppression, dangerous working conditions and dismal economic circumstances.

Many Shan migrant workers in Thailand live in makeshift camps. (Photo: Saw Yan Naing/The Irrawaddy)

Sam Htun earned 10,000 to 20,000 kyat (about US $9 to $18) a month—barely enough to get by—working on construction sites in Taunggyi, the capital of Shan State. For this, he risked injury daily from hazards like falling objects, exposed wiring and unsafe scaffolding.

“Safety standards on Thai building sites can vary from poor to very high, but in Burma safety is a joke,” Sam said.

In Thailand, Sam can earn around 4,500 baht ($130) a month, from which he usually manages to send back 17,000 kyat ($15) every month to his family.

Some Shan workers do relatively well. Sai Maung, who works as a building subcontractor in Chiang Mai, said he transfers about 100,000 baht ($1,940) each year to his parents in Lang Kho in Shan State.

Of the 2 to 4 million Burmese migrants currently living in Thailand, 500,000 are thought to be ethnic Shan living and working in northern Thailand, according to Burmese and regional labor rights groups.

The Shan in Thailand are one of the largest groups remitting money to their families in Burma. How much they are sending back home is hard to estimate as they tend not to use hundi agents—go-betweens who transfer money to workers’ families in Burma—preferring to entrust their savings with close friends who go back, or take it themselves.

Jackie Pollock, a founder of the Migrant Assistance Program (MAP), a Chiang Mai-based NGO, said migrant workers leave Burma because of poor economic prospects and human rights abuses committed by the Burmese regime.

Sam Htun, center, at a workshop for migrant workers in Chiang Mai, Thailand. (Photo: Saw Yan Naing/The Irrawaddy)

“Even though the migrants are paid less than the minimum daily wage (about $4.75) and do not have very much freedom in Thailand, it is still more than they would earn in Burma.

“In Thailand, if you get a decent employer, then you may make quite a reasonable salary. There is no chance of this in Burma,” she said.

Migrants have the chance to complain and can resort to the Thai legal system, but if they are exploited and abused by their employers in Burma, “they can do nothing,” Pollock said, adding that abuse in Burma can include extortionate taxes, forced labor and land confiscation.

Labor rights observers say that, while Shan workers want to escape oppression in Burma, the availability of work and the higher wages offered in Thailand are major incentives, and migrants are prepared to pay considerable amounts to get across the border.

Sai Maung said four relatives who had arrived in Chiang Mai in late 2008 had to pay 100,000 kyat ($90) each to authorities and militias for their trip to Thailand.

Sein Kyi, editor of the Chiang Mai-based Shan Herald Agency for News, said at least 200 Shan migrant workers with border passes cross daily into Thailand, using the bridge between Tachilek in Shan State and Mae Sai in Thailand’s Chiang Rai Province. Many others, however, cross illegally.

Illegal migrant workers not only have to bribe the Burmese army, but also the armed groups whose territories they must cross on their journey to Thailand. Both the Shan State Army and United Wa State Army are said to be involved in the smuggling process. A one-way trip reportedly costs around 10,000 to 11,000 baht ($290 to $320). When they get to Thailand the migrants then have to pay the Thai authorities.

Andy Hall, the migrant justice program director of the Human Rights and Development Foundation, which focuses on migrant safety in the workplace, said, “The migration will surely go on as Thailand still needs workers—perhaps another 2 or 3 million more.”

Culture also plays a role. “Shan migrant workers are very special for Thai employers because their language is similar to Northern Thai, and their culture is very close to the Thai culture,” Hall said.

However, once the migrants have arrived in Thailand, their troubles are far from over.

“Some of the riskiest work for migrants in Thailand is in the construction industry, where substandard safety procedures often lead to accidents,” said Hall, adding that little if any compensation is paid in such circumstances.

Sai Leng, who is the chairman of the Kuang Gor camp for Shan refugees in Chiang Mai’s Wieng Heng District, said Shan migrants take jobs that Thai people do not want because the work is difficult, dirty and dangerous, and the pay is low.

Kuang Gor camp is home to more than 600 Shan who are not officially refugees, but who are allowed to work outside the camp. Kuang Gor is assisted by the Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), which supplies basic foods such as rice, cooking oil, salt and yellow beans to the migrants.

Sally Thompson, the deputy director of the TBBC, said the camp’s Shan occupants do not have proper protection and risk arrest and repatriation.

Unlike refugees in the nine other camps along the Thai-Burmese border, the Shan in Kuang Kor are not treated as refugees and have no chance of resettlement in third countries because they are not registered with the Thai Ministry of Interior and the UNHCR, Thompson said.

“They aren’t just vulnerable to arrest, detention and deportation at any time. Unlike properly registered refugees, they have no access to health care, and their children don’t get any education,” said Thompson.

Jackie Pollock described how MAP had helped a Shan migrant after he was caught in a police sweep at a building site in Chiang Mai.

“First, his wife had to go to her husband’s employer to get his papers, but he wouldn’t give them to her unless she paid him 2,000 baht [$60]. When she showed them at the police station, the police weren’t interested.

“They kept him in jail for 48 days, which is the legal maximum they could hold him without charges, before releasing him—and he was a registered migrant worker, not an illegal,” said Pollock.

Pollock described how it was common practice for the police to round up all workers in a sweep, whether registered or not, and put them in jail. The migrant workers are encouraged to pay “fines” if they want to get back quickly to their families and work.

Sai Leng said arrest is a big threat facing migrant workers in daily life. If arrested, they have to pay relatively large amounts of money to be released.

“We want the Thai authorities to make it easier for the migrant worker to travel from one place to another. If they treated us migrants better, they would get more work out of us,” he said.

Despite enjoying a better life in Thailand, Sai Leng said he still hoped to go back to his hometown in Burma when conditions improve.

READ MORE---> The Grass is Greener...

An ‘Evening with Rohingya People’

KPN - An ‘Evening with Rohingya People’ was an event organized by the London based Burmese Rohingya community with the help of the Burma Campaign UK to share the dilemma of the Rohingya and discuss other Burmese multi-ethnic conflict topics on August 27, at 28 Charles Square London, said Tun Khin, the president of Burmese Rohingya Organization UK (BROUK).

An Evening With Rohingya People

READ MORE---> An ‘Evening with Rohingya People’...

China seals Myanmar border

One person on Chinese territory has been killed by a bomb flung across the border

LINCANG (Yunnan) ST- FRESH fighting in north-east Myanmar erupted yesterday morning after days of clashes that killed at least one person on Chinese territory and sent dozens of wounded to hospitals along the Chinese border.

Tens of thousands of people have fled to the border town of Nansan in China's Yunnan province this month after clashes in Kokang in Myanmar's Shan state, following the deployment of Myanmar government troops in the area.

'Our information is that as many as 30,000 people may have taken shelter in Nansan since Aug 8, saying they were fleeing fighting between Myanmar government troops and ethnic minority groups,' said spokesman Andrej Mahecic for the UN refugee agency.

Chinese soldiers are guarding the border area, which has been sealed off, said a staff member at the Zhenkang County Public Security Bureau, who gave only his surname, Hui.

One person was killed and several people were injured by a bomb thrown across the Chinese border on Friday, Mr He Yongchun, deputy president of Yunnan branch of the Chinese Red Cross, told the China Daily.

'We have received at least 22 injured people sent from Nansan. Most of them are from Myanmar,' a woman working at the surgical department of Zhenkang People's Hospital told Reuters by phone.

Nansan is a town in Zhenkang county.

China has called on Myanmar to maintain stability in the border region and sought more measures to protect the security and legal rights of Chinese citizens there.

Beijing is one of Myanmar's few diplomatic backers, often coming to the rescue when it is subjected to pressure by Western governments over issues such as the imprisonment of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

The leader of the Kokang Group which is fighting Myanmar's army said his forces had captured at least 50 soldiers as well as killed more than 30 troops on Thursday and Friday, the Chinese-language Global Times newspaper reported on its website. -- REUTERS, AP

READ MORE---> China seals Myanmar border...